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Abstract
We compare different methods to assess unilateral merger effects in a two-sided market by applying
them to a hypothetical merger in the Dutch newspaper industry. For this, we ﬁrst specify and estimate
a structural model of demand for differentiated products on both the readership and the advertising
side of the market. This allows us to recover price elasticities and indirect network effects. Following
Filistrucchi, Klein, andMichielsen(2010)marginalcostsarethenrecoveredfromanoligopolymodel
of the supply side. We use these estimates of price elasticities, network effects and marginal costs to
compare different methods that can be used to evaluate merger effects: We perform a concentration
analysis based on the Herﬁndahl Hirschmann Index, a Small Signiﬁcant Non-Transitory Increase in
Price test, measure Upward Pricing Pressure, and conduct a full merger simulation.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L13, L40, L82.
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11 Introduction
The newspaper market is a typical example of a so-called two-sided market: Publishers sell content to
readers and advertising slots to advertisers, while taking into account that the demand for advertisements
in a newspaper depends positively on its circulation and readers might be affected by the number (or
concentration) of ads in the newspaper (Anderson and Gabszewicz, 2008).1
There has recently been a surge in merger cases involving two-sided platforms. Famous cases include
the Google/DoubleClick merger, the merger between Dutch ﬂower auction houses, the one between
Dutch yellow page directories, and the recently proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and NYSE
Euronext.2
Network effects play a central role in two-sided markets, and like all markets characterized by network
effectstwo-sidedmarketsshowatendencytowardsconcentration. Thisisdue tothefactthatthenetwork,
and more precisely its size, is valuable to consumers (or at least to those on one side of the market). In
such an environment, ﬁrms (and often also consumers) may also gain from the increased concentration.
When it comes to assessing a proposed merger in such a market, competition authorities are, as a rule,
required to assess whether a horizontal merger is likely to raise concerns with respect to unilateral or
non-coordinated effects (i.e., whether the merger might increase the market power of the merging ﬁrms)
and with respect to coordinated or collusive effects (i.e., whether the merger might make it more likely
that collusion takes place in the market). With regard to the assessment of unilateral merger effects,
competition authorities have traditionally devised different methods to address the issue. For instance,
initial screening has traditionally been based on the analysis of the market shares of the merging parties
and of (the changes in) the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This often meant that mergers among
ﬁrms with market shares below a given threshold and mergers characterized by a post merger HHI and
a change in the HHI below certain thresholds have been almost automatically approved. For mergers
judged to be worthy of further investigation, full merger simulations have only seldom been conducted.
More often, preference has been given to a SSNIP-type test, where it is asked whether the merging ﬁrms
1The issue of whether and to what extent readers like or dislike advertising in a newspaper is an open one. Whereas
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) ﬁnd no effect of advertising on the number of readers of daily newspapers in Italy and Fan
(2010) reaches the same conclusion for US daily newspapers, Kaiser and Wright (2006) and Kaiser and Song (2009) ﬁnd that
advertising increases readers demand for magazines in Germany. Interestingly, when estimating demand non-parametrically,
Sokollu (2010), ﬁnds that advertising has a non-linear effect on demand for magazines in Germany.
2The cases are NMa case 5901/Bloemensveiling Alsmeer–Flora Holland, NMa case 6246/European Directories–Truvo
Nederland, and DG-Comp case 11/948 Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext, respectively.
2would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to raise prices post merger by a given threshold price increase, usually 5 or 10
percent, if rivals were assumed not to react.3More recently, Farrell and Shapiro (2010) proposed to use
the concept of Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP), which measures the tendency to increase prices post
merger due to the internalization of the cross effects between the merging products when one allows for
a benchmark level of efﬁciency gains from the merger, again 5 or 10 percent. The UPP concept has been
modiﬁed by Salop and Moresi (2009) and has been generalized to GeUPP in Jaffe and Weyl (2011).
Importantly, it has been adopted in the 2010 US merger guidelines. The debate has centered around
whether pricing pressure indexes only represent an improvement with respect to market concentration
analysis or may substitute also for merger simulation.
In any case, these tools for assessing unilateral merger effects have mainly been developed for single-
sided markets. Yet, as explained in Wright (2004), analyzing a two-sided market as if it were a single-
sided market may lead to mistakes and unintended consequences in the application of competition policy.
This is mainly because ﬁrms’ pricing decisions do not only depend on own- and cross-price elasticities
of demand on both sides of the market, as they would in a single-sided market with a multi-product ﬁrm,
but also on the own- and cross-elasticities of demand on one side with respect to demand on the other
side, i.e. the network effects.
For example, in the newspaper market, when considering to increase the subscription prices after a
merger, newspapers will take into account that such an increase will not only have a negative effect on
subscription revenues through its negative effect on circulation, but also a negative effect on advertising
revenues as decreased circulation leads to a decline in the demand for advertising. For the same reason,
such an increase in price might lead to a decline not only in readers’ welfare but also in advertisers’
welfare (the former effect is partly offset if readers are ad-averse, and enhanced if instead they are ad-
loving). This not only makes a price increase less likely, but it also has an impact on the social desirability
of the merger.
When it comes to assessing unilateral merger effects, it has been known for some time already that,
in a market characterized by positive (direct) network effects, it is not necessarily the case that a higher
concentration will be detrimental to consumer welfare. On the one hand, higher concentration is likely to
3SSNIP stands for “Small but Signiﬁcant and Non-transitory Increase in Price”. Originally, the SSNIP test was devised for
market deﬁnition and as such asks the question of whether a hypothetical monopolist would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to raise the price
by 5 or 10 percent. This is why the test is sometimes called the Hypothetical Monopolist Test. Note that in the original context
of the test it is somewhat more natural to assume that the prices of the products not owned by the hypothetical monopolists
remains unchanged. See Section 6 for further discussion.
3lead, in the absence of efﬁciency gains, to a higher price; on the other hand, it is also likely to correspond
to a higher utility derived from the good and a higher willingness to pay for the good. Since consumer
welfare is usually conceived as dependent on the difference between the willingness to pay of consumers
and the price they pay, the net effect will depend on whether the price increases more than the willingness
to pay, and vice versa.
In a two-sided market, the issue is more complex than in a market with only a direct network effect. This
is due to the presence of (often two) indirect network externalities that link two distinct demands and
that need not necessarily both be positive. Therefore, the question arises whether the two-sided nature of
the market increases or decreases the tendency of merging ﬁrms to raise prices after the merger and, in
an economic approach to competition policy, whether a higher price necessarily leads to a higher loss in
consumer welfare and in turn higher allocative inefﬁciency.
In this paper, we investigate different ways to assess unilateral merger effects in a two-sided market by
applying them to an hypothetical merger in the Dutch newspaper market. We ﬁrst specify a structural
model of demand for differentiated products on both the readers and the advertisers side of the market.
We use it to recover price elasticities, indirect network effects and, following Filistrucchi, Klein, and
Michielsen (2010), also marginal costs. We then compare, in a typical two-sided setting as the newspa-
pers one, different approaches to the assessment of unilateral merger effects: HHI, SSNIP, UPP and a
full merger simulation that is again based on the model.
Turning to the literature, theoretical work on mergers among two-sided platforms is still scarce. Most
of the policy implications derived from the theory stem from the comparison between oligopoly and
monopoly equilibria. A paper speciﬁcally focused on mergers is Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009)
who present an economic model of the newspaper market and show that it is not necessarily the case
that a monopolist will choose to set higher prices than competing duopolists on either side of the market,
provided that readers are heterogeneous with respect to the value they bring to advertisers and the less
valuable readers are also those who are more price-sensitive. A recent paper by Leonello (2010) analyzes
mergers in a similar setting. Her model also has differentiated products à la Hotelling on both sides of
the market and two oligopolistic platforms merging into a monopoly. She ﬁnds that, even in the absence
of efﬁciency gains, because of the existence of indirect network effects, merging platforms have the
incentive to keep their prices low after the merger on at least one side of the market. Finally, Malam
(2011) proposes a model of differentiated products à la Salop (1979) on both sides of the market, but
4where the side consuming content does not pay. He ﬁnds mergers (to monopoly) among ad-sponsored
platforms have a competition-intensifying effect, which offsets the incentive to increase prices on the
advertiser side.
The theoretical literature distinguishes between the price level (roughly the sum of the two prices) and
the price structure (roughly their ratio) and shows that, in general, in a two-sided market a merged ﬁrm
will tend to raise the price level, but it is also likely to change the price structure.4In fact, a two-sided
market is often deﬁned as a market in which not only the price level, but also the price structure matters
for the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. Consequently, not only the price level, but also the price structure determines
consumer welfare, and more generally total welfare. The literature shows that more concentration leads
in general to a less efﬁcient price level, but not necessarily a less efﬁcient price structure. As a result, it
is not clear whether higher concentration and more market power lead to a welfare loss, not even if one
focusses attention on consumer welfare.
Also the empirical literature on mergers involving two-sided platforms is still scarce. Evans and Noel
(2008) point out that, as the Lerner pricing formula does not hold in such markets, traditional merger
simulation models are wrongly speciﬁed if applied without modiﬁcations to two-sided or multi-sided
platforms. They also perform an analysis of the merger between Google and DoubleClick, which is
actually the ﬁrst empirical analysis in the literature of a merger in a two-sided industry. They show that
relying on conventional methods would have led to signiﬁcantly different results than using methods that
explicitly incorporate the two-sided nature of this market. Nevertheless, they only perform a calibration
exercise due to a lack of data. Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) assess mergers in the Canadian
newspaper market, but their analysis is mainly an ex post merger evaluation of the effects of the merger.
They use a two-sided Hotelling model to explain their ﬁnding that greater concentration did not lead to
higher prices for either readers or advertisers. Yet, they do not build and estimate a structural econometric
model and therefore, their framework cannot be used to simulate mergers.
In our merger simulation, we follow Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2010) who build a structural
econometric framework to simulate the effects of mergers among two-sided platforms selling differen-
tiated products and competing à la Bertrand on each side of the market. Their framework extends the
supply model of Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) to the more general case of a two-sided market with
4We use the word “roughly”, because in a two-sided market without a transaction among users of the platform one needs to
reduce the two prices to the same unit of measurement by appropriate weights. In a newspaper market, the price level is equal
to the per copy revenues from both the readership and the advertising side, while the price structure is the ratio of the revenues
from both sides.
5two network effects.5 For this reason it differs also from Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009) who
analyze mergers in the Belgian newspapers market and, consistently with their empirical ﬁndings, as-
sume no effect of advertising on readership. Jeziorski (2011) studies instead mergers between US radio
stations. In his model, listeners do not pay a monetary price to listen to the radio but advertising generates
a nuisance cost. Our model is more general in that customers on both sides, readers and advertisers, pay
a price to access the platform. Finally, Fan (2010) analyzes mergers among US newspapers. Whereas
the framework of Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2010) is more general than hers when it comes to
to analyzing merger effects on prices, as it allows for advertising to affect readers, her model allows her
to account for endogenous changes in the quality of the newspapers after the merger, if data on quality
are available. As such data are not in our data set, we abstract from quality changes due to the merger.6
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we identify the main features of the Dutch market for daily
newspapers. Section 3 describes the data set. In Section 4, we specify a model of demand for both sides
of the market. Section 5 reports estimation results and estimated elasticities. In Section 6, we turn to the
hypothetical merger and present results from a concentration analysis, a SSNIP-type test, UPP measures,
and results from the full merger simulation. Section 7 summarizes our ﬁndings and concludes.
2 The Dutch market for daily newspapers
The Dutch market for daily newspapers shows patterns that are typical for a newspaper market in the
ﬁrst decade of the 21st century. In Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2010), we document that in this
period, real newspaper prices have increased, while at least some input prices such as wages and print
costshavenot. Readershipdemandhasdecreased, whichismostlikelyduetotheincreasedavailabilityof
online news. Also, free newspapers have entered, but it is not clear whether this has caused a signiﬁcant
decrease in readership in the other daily newspapers. Finally, the total amount spent on advertising has
remained constant.
To put our merger simulation into perspective, we now describe it in a bit more detail. There are eight
important national level newspapers, Algemeene Dagblad, De Telegraaf, De Volkskrant, Het Financieele
5Also Song (2011) extends the framework used by Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) to two network effects and then uses
it to test for collusion in the Italian newspaper market. He then estimates markups for German magazine and shows that
magazines typically set copy prices below marginal costs and earn proﬁts from selling advertising pages.
6In practice, although in many circumstances it would probably be relevant, the assessment of unilateral merger effects does
not tackle the issue of product repositioning or, if it does, the analysis is mainly qualitative.
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Dagblad, Het Parool, NRC Handelsblad, nrc.next, and Trouw. Besides, there are 2 important free news-
papers, Sp!ts since the fourth quarter of 2001 and Metro since fourth quarter of 2006.7 They distribute a
signiﬁcant number of copies in public areas such as train stations.
In 2005, Algemeene Dagblad merged with 7 regional newspapers, and their editions were replaced by
regional editions of Algemeene Dagblad. 63 percent of the shares of the newly formed AD NieuwsMedia
were from then on owned by PCM, and 37 percent by Wegener. The effects of this are shown in Figure
1 and Figure 2.
7We model them as part of the outside good when estimating readership demand and allow the value of the outside good to
increase with time. Also the increased value of not buying a newspaper and reading news online is captured by the dependence
of the value of the outside good on time.
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Subscription revenues
Then, in 2009, PCM bought the remaining shares in AD NieuwsMedia from Wegener and at the same
time De Persgroep Nederland, also owning de Volkskrant, NRC Handelsblad, nrc.next, Het Parool and
Trouw, bought 51 percent of PCM. This merger needed to be approved by the Dutch competition author-
ity (NMa). The NMa imposed as a condition on De Persgroep Nederland to sell NRC Handelsblad and
nrc.next. The reason for this was that otherwise, PCM would dominate the market for quality newspapers
in Amsterdam as it owns Het Parool, Trouw and De Volkskrant.
In the merger simulation below we ﬁrst simulate the effect of this remedy and then, starting from this, the
effect of a merger between NRC Handelsblad, nrc.next, and De Telegraaf, Gooi- en Eemlander, Haarlems
8Dagblad, Leidsch Dagblad, and Noordhollands Dagblad.8
3 Data
Our most important data source on the readership side is yearly circulation data at the level of 512
municipalities, which we obtained from Cebuco. These are merged with data on subscription prices. We
use subscription prices because unlike in other countries, almost all of the copies (91 percent according
to our data) are sold in the form of subscriptions.
For the advertising side, we obtained quarterly data from Nielsen on the amount of advertising, which is
measured in column millimeters, and the advertising revenues of each newspaper according to list prices.
From these, we calculate the (weighted) average list price per column millimeter. Nielsen also provided
us with data on the total number of pages of the newspapers, and information on the format, which is
measured by the number of column millimeters per page.
We allow the demand for advertising in a newspaper to depend on the characteristics of the readers of
this newspaper. For this, we obtained Nederlands Onderzoek Media (NOM) Print Monitor national level
data on reach by age, gender, income and wealth, being a breadwinner or not, shopping for groceries or
not, as well as reach by region.9
The market size is given by the total population over 13 years of age in the Netherlands. Data on this is
provided by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). CBS also provided data on the consumer price index, which
we use to express prices in year-2002 Euros, and geographical data that we use in Figure 3 below.
4 A model of demand
As argued above, when predicting merger effects in a two-sided market, key inputs into the economic
analysis are price elasticities and indirect network elasticities on each side of the market, or equivalently
8Sp!ts is also part of the Telegraaf group, but we treat it as part of the outside good for the entire analysis. This is not likely
to alter our conclusions on the readership side, as long as it remains a free newspaper. In Section 4.1 below we motivate our
use of a model for the advertising side in which newspapers do not directly compete with one another. Given that we use this
model also conclusions for the advertising market are likely to be unaffected.
9Reach differs from circulation in that reach is the number of people reading a newspaper, whereas circulation is the number
of copies that are distributed. Circulation can be divided into paid and unpaid circulation. Most of the circulation is paid, and
as already pointed out above, most of the paid circulation is paid subscriptions.
9diversion ratios.
Lacking other sources of information on diversion ratios, we proceed to estimate the responsiveness of
readership demand to changes in newspaper prices and advertising intensity and the responsiveness of
advertising demand to changes in advertising prices and the circulation of a newspaper.10
For this, we use a model of demand for differentiated products on each side of the market. The next
section introduces a model of advertising demand, the subsequent section then speciﬁes a model of
readership demand. Throughout, the superscript “r” stands for “readership” (as in the cover price of that
newspaper) and the superscript “a” stands for “advertisement” (as in the price of an advertisement).
4.1 Advertising demand













jt isthequantityofadvertisinginnewspaper j attimet, whichismeasuredincolumnmillimeters,
pa
jt is the advertising price per column millimeter, and xa
jt are characteristics of the newspapers from the
point of view of advertisers, such as the demographics of readers of newspaper at time t.
Such a reduced form is natural in a model in which readers buy at most one newspaper and advertisers
buy advertising slots from all platforms. It is similar to the one proposed by Rysman (2004), which is
used also by Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009) and Fan (2010), in that it assumes that there are no
direct cross price effects and no direct network effects, so that the decision to advertise in a newspaper
only depends on the costs and beneﬁts of advertising in that newspaper and is independent of the decision
to advertise in other newspapers. We follow them in imposing that the reduced form is of the constant
elasticity form and additionally assume that the network effect enters the demand function in such a way
that it is the price per reader which matters to the advertisers. This is a common assumption in theoretical
models of media markets such as for instance Anderson and Gabszewicz (2008). It can also be justiﬁed
by looking at the evolution of the average advertising price per reader for the merging parties around the
time of the merger in Figure 1.
10An antitrust authority might instead have access to internal documents of the merging ﬁrms indicating how much of the
loss in sales that is due to a price increase the ﬁrm has been considering is expected to beneﬁt rival products.
10In our reduced form, the elasticity of demand with respect to the advertising price per column millime-
ter is equal to αa, and the elasticity with respect to the number of readers is given by the negative of
that, −αa. We use an instrumental variables estimator to estimate αa and at the same time control for
newspaper ﬁxed effects to capture the effect of unobserved (to the econometrician) characteristics of
the newspapers in the eyes of advertisers. We also control for quarter dummies in order to account for
changes in overall demand for print advertising. These time effects could originate in the business cycle,
to which advertising demand is in general linked, and the appearance of online advertising as a possible
substitute for print advertising. So, to summarize, we assume that ξa
jt = ξa
j +ξn
t . Our instrument is the
total number of pages of content in the newspaper, which is related to the endogenous variable, pa
jt/qr
jt,
through the increased value of the newspaper to readers, which translates into an increased circulation.
It is unrelated to advertising demand if newspaper companies decide on this without knowing the re-
alization of εa
jt, which is plausible as we already control for time effects and newspaper ﬁxed effects.







On thereadership side, weestimate a Berry(1994)typelogit model ofdemand fornewspapers. However,
departing from the usual practice, we do so on the municipality level. The advantage this is that the
substitution patterns that are implied for the national level are much more realistic. This is because we
add up cross effects over municipalities. If then, e.g., two regional level newspapers never compete
because there is no municipality in which both are available, then added-up cross effects will be zero,
whereas they will not if we use national level data with a standard logit model. In the following, however,
we suppress the municipality subscript m, for the ease of the exposition.
We assume the potential market size to be the population above 13 years of age and that each consumer
buys at most one newspaper. The utility from buying a newspaper depends, among other things, on
the price of that newspaper and the amount of advertising in that newspaper. Formally, the utility of








jt is the price of the newspaper, qa
jt is the amount of advertising content in the newspaper, ξr
jt
captures unobserved characteristics and εr
ijt is the part of the utility derived from buying newspaper j
that is speciﬁc to individual i at time t. We assume that εr
ijt is distributed according to the type 1 extreme
value distribution independently across j and t. Individuals buy one newspaper or choose the outside
good, j = 0, buying no newspaper. The outside good yields average utility 0 so that ur
i0t = ε0t.











































in which the difference between the natural logarithm of the market share of good j and the natural
logarithm of the market share of the outside good is equal to the utility from observed characteristics
pr
jt, qa
jt and unobserved characteristic ξr
jt. The left hand side of this equation is observed because sr
jt and
sr
0t are observed, and the coefﬁcients αr and βr can be consistently estimated if ξr
jt is uncorrelated with
pr
jt and qa
jt. For this to be plausible we control for a ﬂexible time trend by means of year dummies to
capture the increased importance of outside options such as online news and free newspapers and also
control for newspaper-region ﬁxed effects.11 It is important to allow for different ﬁxed effect per region
as a national level newspaper with a focus on Amsterdam, such as Het Parool, will be valued differently,
on average, in the region around Amsterdam, as opposed to in the south of the country.
From the estimates of αr and βr, and using the observed market shares, we can calculate the responsive-












11There are 5 regions with on average about 3 million people living in each region. These regions are reasonably small in
terms of geographical distance.
12Table 1: Advertising demand parameter estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log price per reader -0.702 -0.636 -0.617 -0.738
(0.085) (0.092) (0.138) (0.147)
age and gender No Yes Yes Yes
income and wealth No No Yes Yes
region No No No Yes
obs. 1051 858 732 732
This table shows instrumental variables estimates from a regression of
the natural logarithm of the column millimeters of advertising sold per
quarter on the natural logarithm of the price of advertising per reader.
We control for newspaper ﬁxed effects and quarter dummies. Control-
ling for income and wealth includes controlling for the fraction of in-
dividuals who are breadwinners and the fraction of individuals who go
shopping for groceries. We use the number of total pages of content in
the newspaper as an instrument.




























5 Estimation results and estimated elasticities
In this section, we present our demand parameter estimates, on which our subsequent analysis is based.
We start with the advertising demand parameters in Table 1. We only report the coefﬁcient on the log
price per reader, denoted by αa in Section 4.1 above.
There are four speciﬁcations, which differ by the variables in xa
jt. There are missing values for some
of these variables, and therefore the number of observations decreases the more variables we include.
More speciﬁcally, we do not include any variables in speciﬁcation (1), control for age categories and
gender in column (2), additionally for income and wealth categories as well as the fraction of bread
winners and people shopping for groceries among the readers in speciﬁcation (3), and ﬁnally in addition
for region in speciﬁcation (4). Throughout, we control for newspaper ﬁxed effects and quarter dummies.
The instrumental variables estimates of αa are remarkably stable across speciﬁcations, and we estimate





small format 0.08838 0.00346
Market level logit estimates. p is the subscription
price per year, in Euros of 2002. mm are mil-
limeters of advertising and are measured in mil-
lion column millimeters, and size is measured in
billion. A newspaper is of a small fromat if it
has less than 2,800 column millimeters per page.
We also include a full set of year dummies and
region-paper ﬁxed effects.
the elasticity of advertising demand with respect to the price per reader to be about −0.7.
Table 2 contains readership demand estimates. We estimate mean utility to decrease signiﬁcantly in the
subscription price, to increase in the amount of advertising in the newspaper, the amount of content,
and that readers value newspapers to be of small format. Following Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen
(2010) we calculate the implied marginal effects and elasticities from the model. The average own price
elasticity is about −1.75 and the average advertising elasticity is about 0.05. This means that readers
are ad-loving, but this is not very pronounced. This is plausible in our case as it is possible to skip
advertisements, unlike when watching a movie on TV, some advertisements may be informative and
hence valued by readers, and the percentage of advertising content is relatively low.
6 A hypothetical merger
Competition authorities are, as a rule, required to assess whether a horizontal merger is likely to raise
concerns with respect to unilateral or non-coordinated effects (i.e. whether the merger might increase the
market power of the merging ﬁrms) and with respect to coordinated or collusive effects (i.e. whether the
merger might make it more likely that collusion takes place in the market). In order to assess unilateral
effects a competition authority needs to predict, at least to some extent, whether prices are likely to rise
as a result of the merger.
From the point of view of economics, the correct way to evaluate whether a merger is likely to lead to
higher prices would be to specify a model of the market in question, estimate demand in order to recover
values for the parameters of the model and then use the models and the estimated parameters to predict
14the price chosen by the ﬁrms after the merger. One can then compare the prices, consumer surplus
and/or total welfare in the new equilibrium with those in the old equilibrium. If correctly undertaken it
is rigerous as it involves making all the assumptions underlying the the analysis explicit and stating all
the limitations of the data; and ideally, it allows the reader to evaluate the robustness of the results. In
Section 6.4, we show the results of such a full merger simulation.
Merger simulation can be very time consuming. As a result, it is often not performed in practice. In fact,
in many cases a SSNIP-type test is used to predict the effects of a merger. Speciﬁcally, the SSNIP test is
often performed by using Critical Loss Analysis and Critical Elasticity Analysis formulas derived under
the assumption of constant marginal costs and either linear or iso-elastic demand. In merger evaluation,
the formulas are not used to set an (implicit) benchmark on when substitution across products is enough
to consider that they are in the same relevant market (which is what is done for market deﬁnition).
Instead, they are used to measure the likelihood of a substantial non-transitory increase in price by the
merging parties. That means that instead of simulating the effects of a price increase by a hypothetical
monopolist above the current (competitive) level, practitioners simulate the effects of a price increase
above the current level by the merging parties, assuming rivals do not change their prices and check
whether that price increase is proﬁtable or not. In either case, the size of the price increase is given
beforehand and is not chosen optimally by the ﬁrms.12 Clearly, the simpliﬁcation of the SSNIP test
comes at the cost of the assumption that rivals prices remain unchanged after the merger.
In line with their quest for ﬁnding time-saving tools to evaluate a merger, Farrell and Shapiro (2010)
propose measuring the upward pricing pressure that is due to a merger, allowing for threshold levels of
efﬁciency gains with various levels of precision. As for the SSNIP test an assumption that underlies
their analysis is that rivals do not react to price changes of the merging ﬁrms. Their approach has been
incorporated in the 2010 US merger guidelines. Although the formulas proposed by Farrell and Shapiro
(2010) are derived for a Bertrand oligopoly, Jaffe and Weyl (2011) generalize the concept to other forms
of competition and argue that it can be used as a ﬁrst order approximation to merger effects. In Section
6.2 we present results from a two-sided market extension of the UPP measure of Farrell and Shapiro
(2010).
12This is the test in the EU. In the US, the formulas are often used to calculate the optimal price increase above the current
level by the merging parties keeping rivals’ prices constant. Also in the US, the formulas for Critical Loss Analysis (CLA)
or Critical Elasticity Analysis (CEA) assume constant marginal costs and either linear or iso-elastic demand. As with market
deﬁnition, the difference between the SSNIP and the HM test appears to be very small at ﬁrst sight and it is a matter of debate
whether this difference is in practice relevant or not. In Section 6.3 we present results from both versions of the test.
15According to the EU merger guidelines, and up to the most recent version of the US ones, a ﬁrst screen-
ing of mergers can be done based on the concentration they lead to on the relevant market. Although
requiring market deﬁnition as a previous step in the analysis, such an assessment is per se the quickest
and easiest one. It is well-known however that the relationship between market power as measured by
the Lerner index and the HHI index holds perfectly only in case of Cournot competition with homoge-
neous products. Thus, once again, from a theoretical point of view simplicity comes at the cost of often
unrealistic assumptions. We perform a market concentration analysis in Section 6.1.
In order to illustrate the different methods to assess unilateral merger effects, we apply them to the anal-
ysis of the effects of a hypothetical merger between NRC Handelsblad (NRC) and nrc.next (NRN) on
the one hand, and De Telegraaf (TEL), Gooi- en Eemlander (GOO), Haarlems Dagblad (HAR), Leidsch
Dagblad (LEI), and Noordhollands Dagblad (NOR).13 Given our data set, we assess the merger as if
it were to take place in 2009 and therefore use the market shares, market sizes, prices and ownership
structure of 2009 as the pre-merger situation. We do so in the context of the demand model we have de-
scribed in Section 4. Using the estimated parameters reported in Section 5, again following Filistrucchi,
Klein, and Michielsen (2010), we recover marginal costs that would rationalize observed behavior of
proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms that compete in prices with differentiated products on each side of the market.14
These estimates are then used for the SSNIP test, UPP analysis and the merger simulation. As explained
in Section 2 above, we ﬁrst simulate the equilibrium in what we take as the initial situation in which
NRC and nrc.next become independent after having belonged to De Persgroep.
The next four sub-sections present each the application one of the above four different methods to the
assessment of the unilateral effects of the above hypothetical merger in the Dutch newspaper industry.
We will proceed in increasing order of complexity.
6.1 Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index
One of the most common ways to asses market power is to use the HHI, which is given by the sum
of the squared market shares in a market, multiplied by 10,000. On the advertising side, assuming the
13The abbreviations in parentheses are used in Table 3 below.
14As explained in Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2010) this involves ﬁrst ﬁnding the derivatives of both demands with
respect to prices on all sides of the market in order to write the ﬁrst order conditions, then inverting the set of ﬁrst order
conditions, one for each newspaper and each price. Here, we incorporate the ownership structure in the industry. We ﬁnd
margins to be about 60 percent on the readership side and 40 percent on the advertising side. This is somewhat different from
Kaiser and Wright (2006) and Song (2011), who ﬁnd that often negative margin on the readers side for German magazines.
16relevant product market is the one for advertising in paid daily newspapers in Dutch (thus excluding free
newspapers) and the relevant geographic market is the national one, the pre-merger HHI is 2,174 and the
post-merger one is 2,366, which means that the change that is due to the merger is  HHI of 192.15
Likewise, on the readership side of the market, assuming the relevant product market is the one for copies
of paid daily newspapers in Dutch (once more excluding the free press) and the relevant geographic
market is the whole of the Netherlands, the pre-merger HHI is 2,571, the post-merger one is 3,099, and
hence  HHI is 528.16 Applying the thresholds of the EU merger guidelines the merger would thus be
investigated.
One of the major criticisms against the use of the HHI in screening mergers is that it is highly dependent
on the deﬁnition of the relevant market. In fact, the above conclusions regarding the readership side
may change drastically if we deﬁne the relevant geographic market as the municipality one. In such
a case, the post-merger HHI and the  HHI calculated at the municipality level would also lead the
merger to be scrutinized because of concerns about unilateral effects in many of the municipalities. At
the municipality level, concentration is much higher, as indicated by a pre- and post-merger HHI of
more than 5,000 on average, because many newspapers are regional. In many of them, concentration
would change considerably more due to the merger. Figure 3 shows a map of the Netherlands, where we
indicate in which municipalities a merger would be scrutinized if the relevant geographic markets were
to be deﬁned as the municipalities.
In addition to the problem of ﬁnding an appropriate deﬁnition of the geographical market, the use of
the HHI leads to another potential fallacy in a two-sided market, namely the failure to account for the
existence of indirect network effects. If these network effects are strong enough, the conclusions drawn
from looking at concentration on each side of the market might be wrong even if the market deﬁnition
on the two sides of the market is the correct one.17
15Here and in the following, we ﬁrst aggregate the market shares by newspaper company, then square them, and ﬁnally add
them up. This is necessary as newspaper publishing companies are multi-product ﬁrms.
16Absent a price, we do not have a straightforward way to estimate cross-price elasticities or diversion ratios for the free
press. Therefore, even though it is straightforward to calculate HHIs without doing so, we prefer to abstract from them also in
this section in order to be consistent in our comparison of the different methods for assessing unilateral effects.
17See Filistrucchi (2008) and Filistrucchi, van Damme, and Affeldt (2011) for a discussion of the correct SSNIP test for
market deﬁnition in a two-sided market. While the former presents also the correct formulas for Critical Loss Analysis, the
latter compares the theory to the practice of market deﬁnition in two-sided markets.
17Figure 3: Municipalities in which merger would be scrutinized
not scrutinized
scrutinized
6.2 Upward pricing pressure
UPP is a more reﬁned measure of unilateral effects. It was proposed by Farrell and Shapiro (2010) and
measures the tendency to raise prices of the merging ﬁrms due to the merger. The underlying idea is
that if two ﬁrms merge, they have lower restraints from raising prices because part of the sales they
would lose when increasing prices would go to the product of the other ﬁrm they have now merged with.
Clearly, provided the products of merging parties are substitutes, UPP is always positive (assuming the
merging ﬁrms are not colluding). For this reason, if one wants to use it to screen mergers, one has to
establish a benchmark. Farrell and Shapiro (2010) propose to give an efﬁciency credit of 5 or 10 percent
to the merging ﬁrms and propose different formulas for UPP, which differ in the way they take efﬁciency
gains into account.
Allowing only for a direct effect of the efﬁciency gains, the correct UPP formula for two multi-product






















for the advertising side. Here, e.g., pa
j is the vector of advertising tariffs and mca
j is the vector of marginal
costs of ﬁrm j on the advertising side, while er
k and ea
k are the percentage efﬁciency credits given to the
products of ﬁrm k, on the readers and the advertisers side respectively. Dra
kj is the matrix containing diver-
sion ratios when ﬁrm k increases the subscription prices and we look at the effect of this on advertising
demands of ﬁrm j, hence the sub- and superscripts. This matrix can be calculated from the estimated
price effects by pre-multiplying the matrix derivatives of advertising demands of ﬁrm j with respect to
subscription prices of ﬁrm k by the inverse of the matrix of derivatives of advertising quantities of ﬁrm k
with respect to readership prices of ﬁrm k. The other diversion ratios can be calculated accordingly. This
yields a set of numbers, one for each newspaper and each market side.
Table 3 shows the results. It also shows results for the original one-sided measures proposed by Farrell
and Shapiro (2010), ignoring the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (4) and the second term on the right
hand side of (5). To be precise, the Table shows the UPP measures net of the granted efﬁciency gains,
along with an efﬁciency credit of 5 percent. If the sum of the two is positive, then prices will be predicted
to increase. This is the case throughout, except for column one. If UPP is used as a ﬁrst screening device
the merger would thus be scrutinized in most cases.
The ﬁrst column shows instead that, if one were to consider the advertising market disregarding the
two-sided nature of the market, then the merger would not give rise to competitive pressure. This is
due to the assumed functional form for advertising demand, as in such a case no internalization of cross
effects towards competitors is possible if direct price competition does not take place. In such a situation,
one would tend to conclude that the merger does not raise concerns with respect to unilateral effects on
the advertising side. However, once it is taken into account that advertising has an effect on newspaper
readership, oneﬁndsthatthemergerwouldleadtoupwardpricingpressurealsointheadvertisingmarket.
This can be seen in the second column. Such an upward pricing pressure would persist even once an
19Table 3: Upward pricing pressure
advertising price readership price
one-s. UPP two-s. UPP eff. credit one-s. UPP two-s. UPP eff. credit
GOO 0.00 8.18 -0.02 7.93 8.19 -4.71
HAR 0.00 7.11 -0.04 6.90 7.12 -4.52
LEI 0.00 5.83 -0.05 5.66 5.85 -4.52
NOR 0.00 2.79 -0.08 2.72 2.81 -4.35
TEL 0.00 3.71 -0.38 3.62 3.77 -5.49
NRC 0.00 11.23 -0.21 10.57 11.69 -8.84
NRN 0.00 9.97 -0.11 9.39 10.63 -2.62
This table shows one- and two-sided UPP measures as deﬁned in the text, as well as corresponding efﬁciency
credits, which are given by 5% of the corresponding marginal costs of selling one additional column millime-
ter of advertising or newspaper subscription. All but the last two newspapers belong to the Telegraaf group,
which is assumed to be merging with the NRC group consisting of the last two newspapers.
efﬁciency credit were granted to the merging ﬁrm. As a result, when properly taking the two-sided
nature of the market into account, one would ﬁnd that the merger does indeed raise concerns on the
advertising market too. Hence, analyzing one side of the market disregarding the other would lead to a
wrong decision in favor of the merging parties.
Interestingly, on the readership side of the market, once one allows for an efﬁciency credit of 5 percent,
net upward pricing pressure would be negative for some newspapers (De Telegraaf and Noordhollands
dagblad), meaning that these newspapers would be expected to lower their prices following the merger
if efﬁciency gains of at least 5 percent were achieved through the merger.
Finally, comparing the ﬁrst to the second and the fourth to the ﬁfth column shows that accounting for the
two-sided nature of the market always increases upward pricing pressure.
6.3 SSNIP-type test
The “Small Signiﬁcant Non-Transitory Increase in Price” test (SSNIP test in short) was originally de-
signed to deﬁne the relevant market, but it is often used to measure the likelihood of a substantial non
transitory increase in price by the merging parties. In particular, practitioners use it to simulate a given
price increase (usually 5 or 10 percent) above the current level by the merging parties, assuming rivals
do not change their prices and check whether that price increase is proﬁtable or not. If the price increase
is proﬁtable, it is judged to be likely to take place.
We use the extension of the SSNIP test to two-sided markets developed in Filistrucchi (2008) for market
20deﬁnition.18 On each side of the market, the SSNIP test asks whether an increase of the subscription
prices by the merging parties of 5 percent is proﬁtable, assuming rivals keep their prices unchanged.19
The test is modiﬁed in such a way as to account for the presence of the indirect network effects in order
to correctly assess the competitive constraints faced by the merged ﬁrm and therefore the proﬁtability of
a price increase. So that for instance in assessing whether an increase in the cover price of a newspaper
leads to a loss in proﬁts one takes into account that not only a higher cover price will lead to lower
demand and proﬁts from readers but also a lower readership will lead to lower demand and proﬁts from
advertisers. If then readers are found to appreciate advertising, the lower number of advertisements will
lead to an additional loss in demand on the readers side and so on and so forth. In fact, positive indirect
network effects between the different sides of the platform reduce the proﬁtability of any price increase.
We implement both the US and the EU versions of the test and for the EU implement it either allowing
or not allowing the merged ﬁrm to optimally adjust the price on the advertising side when the cover price
is raised.20
Throughout, we present the most complete version of the test, using the proﬁt functions to numerically
ﬁnd optimal prices given the prices of the rivals and possibly own prices on one side of the market.21 As
a result the only difference with respect to the full merger simulation is not allowing rivals to react to the
18As discussed in van Damme, Filistrucchi, Gerardin, Keunen, Klein, Michielsen, and Wileur (2010), when using the SSNIP
approachtoassessthelikelihoodofapriceincreasepost-mergerinatwo-sidedmarket, similarissuesasdiscussedinFilistrucchi
(2008) for market deﬁnition arise, as one needs to decide which price the merged parties should be raising and whether to assess
proﬁtability by taking into account only proﬁts on one side or on both sides of the market. In a two-sided market, in order to
correctly assess the competitive constraints faced by the merged ﬁrm and therefore the proﬁtability of a price increase, one
should take both sides of the market into account. The risk of applying a test which does not account for feedback effects is that
in such cases the merger will be found to be anti-competitive even if, according to the same standards used in a single-sided
market, it should not.
In addition, as explained invan Damme, Filistrucchi, Gerardin, Keunen, Klein, Michielsen, and Wileur (2010), in a non-
transaction market such as the newspapers one, the test should be implemented by ﬁrst raising the price on one side of the
market then the price on the other side of the market. The reason is that there are in fact two interrelated markets and one needs
to assess the competitive constraints faced by the merged ﬁrm on each of them.
19In the EU the test used in market deﬁnition is the "Small Signiﬁcant Non-transitory Increase in Price" (SSNIP) test, in the
US it is called the "Hypothetical Monopolist" (HM) test. The one just described above is the test in the EU. In the US one is
supposed to calculate the optimal price increase above the current level by the merging parties, keeping rivals’ prices constant.
As in the case of market deﬁnition, the difference between the SSNIP and the HM test appears to be very small at ﬁrst sight and
it is a matter of debate whether this difference is in practice relevant or not.
20vanDamme, Filistrucchi, Gerardin, Keunen, Klein, Michielsen, andWileur(2010)arguethat, whereasinthecaseofmarket
deﬁnition the test should be conducted by allowing the monopolist to optimally adjust the price structure, in the assessment of
the merger effects the issue is somewhat minor from a theoretical point of view. The reason is that in a two-sided market, the
SSNIP test suffers from the same restrictive assumptions regarding rivals behavior that we already highlighted for a single-sided
market. If one does not allow the merged ﬁrm to optimally adjust the price structure, as proposed by Evans and Noel (2008)
for market deﬁnition, then the proﬁtability of the rise in prices would be lower, as the optimal adjustment reduces the loss in
proﬁts due to the increase in prices. Since accounting for rivals reactions will in general tend to increase the proﬁtability of the
rise in prices, which of the two effects prevails is not a priori clear.
21We constrain the merged ﬁrm to set prices that are not negative and that do not exceed twice the prices we observe in our
original data. In practice, both in the EU and in the US, the test is often conducted using formulas derived under the assumption
of constant marginal costs and either linear or iso-elastic demand. See Filistrucchi (2008) for a discussion of these formulas
and their extension to two-sided markets.
21Table 4: SSNIP test
average pa average pn proﬁt change
initial situation 4.42 244.14 0.00
5% increase in pa, no adjustment of pn 4.64 244.14 3.05
5% increase in pn, no adjustment of pa 4.42 256.35 -2.43
5% increase in pa, optimal adjustment of pn 4.64 196.37 8.94
5% increase in pn, optimal adjustment of pa 8.83 256.35 35.36
optimal adjustment of both prices 8.83 157.34 61.99
This table shows results of different variants of the SSNIP test. These are average prices and proﬁt changes
when only the merging parties adjust prices. Proﬁt changes are in percent.
price increase.
Table 4 shows results of the different versions of the SSNIP test. It reports (estimated) advertising
tariffs, subscription prices and proﬁt changes (in percentage). The ﬁrst row refers to the status quo, the
last row to the US test. The latter shows that performing the US version of the SSNIP test to assess
the merger would lead to the merger raising competitive concerns not on the readers market (as post
merger the optimal price is lower), but on the advertisers market (as the optimal price increase exceeds
5 percents). Rows two to four refer instead to two different versions of the EU test (with or without the
optimal adjustment of the price structure) for each market (advertising and readership). Consistently with
our theoretical discussion, comparing the second row to the fourth and the third row to the ﬁfth shows
that indeed allowing the ﬁrms to optimally adjust the price on the other side of the market increases
proﬁtabilityofthepricerise. Inaddition, acomparisonofrowonetorowfourandﬁveshowsrespectively
that when exogenously forced to raise price on the reader side of the market by 5 percent the merged ﬁrm
would increase prices also on the advertise of the market, while when forced to raise the advertising tariff
by 5 percent the merged ﬁrm would lower the cover price. The latter result moves in the same direction
of the US test.
Overall, results from a SSNIP-type test would thus suggest that, contrary to what is predicted by an HHI
analysis but consistently with a UPP analysis, the merger raises concerns of unilateral effects on the
advertisers side of the market, and less so on the readers side of the market.
6.4 Full simulation and welfare analysis
From the point of view of economics, the correct way to evaluate whether a merger is likely to lead to
higher prices would be to specify a model of the market in question, estimate demand in order to recover
22values for the parameters of the model and then use the model and the estimated parameters to predict the
price chosen by the ﬁrms after the merger. If cost data are not available, it is possible to recover estimates
for them from the ﬁrst order conditions of a model, as ﬁrst proposed by Rosse (1970), and use also these
estimates to predict the post-merger prices. One can then compare the prices, consumer surplus and/or
total welfare in the new equilibrium with those in the old equilibrium. This can be done assuming there
are no efﬁciency gains or allowing for a threshold level of efﬁciency gains.22 Alternatively, one could
also estimate the size of the (productive) efﬁciency gains necessary to counterbalance the post-merger
tendency to increase prices and to leave consumer surplus unchanged.
In a two-sided market, assuming ﬁrms set prices on each side of the market and demands are interde-
pendent, all of the above is possible but there are additional technical complications involved, due to
the presence of two indirect network effects.23 Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2010) discuss this at
length. Under some regularity conditions on the demand function and on the size of the network effects
it is possible to simulate the new equilibrium.24
Here, we use their framework to recover marginal costs, simulate the new equilibrium and predict the
unilateral effects of the hypothetical merger above. Table 5 summarizes the estimated effects of the
merger on average prices, average quantities, and proﬁts. Here, unweighted averages are taken. More
detailed results are presented in the Appendix, in Tables 7, 8 and 9. The table shows that advertising
prices would not be affected by the merger (a result of our speciﬁcation of advertising demand), while
subscription prices would rise by 1.5 percent.25 As a result, circulation would decline by 2.4 percent,
which in turn would lower advertising demand by 1.7 percent.26 Overall, advertising proﬁts would
22In order to calculate the change in consumer welfare one needs to assume that marginal costs are unchanged or that they
change of a given percentage. To evaluate instead the change in total welfare one needs to calculate the change in ﬁrm proﬁts
due to the merger, under the additional assumption that ﬁxed costs are also unchanged or that they too changed of a threshold
percentage. In fact, to the extent that a competition authority has a consumer welfare standard, the second assumption may not
be necessary.
23More generally, a full simulation approach in a two-sided market is even more complex and time-consuming than in a
traditional market. The reason is that in order to recover the parameters one needs to estimate two demand systems, collect
more data, ﬁnd more instruments and in order to calculate the new market equilibrium, one needs to solve a more complex
supply model.
24As an alternative to the necessary assumptions on the demand function, White and Weyl (2011) propose a reﬁnement of
Nash equilibrium, insulating tariffs, which guarantees the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. In their setting ﬁrms do
not choose prices but commit to a price schedule, whereby prices on one side of the market depend on participation on each
and every platform on the other side of the market.
25Intuitively, the assumption of no direct cross-price effects on the advertising side implies that there are no price effects
that could be internalized in addition by the merging parties. At the same time, changes in the optimal subscription prices will
affect circulation and this will shift the advertising demand, but because of the constant elasticity speciﬁcation for advertising
demand it is the case that advertising prices will be unaffected by those shifts in demand, unless there are efﬁciency gains from
the merger on the advertising side. Note, however, that advertising prices per reader will change.
26We assume here that platforms do not bundle advertising slots on the newspapers they own, neither before nor after the
merger. SeevanDamme, Filistrucchi, Gerardin, Keunen, Klein, Michielsen, andWileur(2010)foradiscussionofhowbundling
23Table 5: Effects of the hypothetical merger
merged not merged
advertising price 0.000 0.000
column millimeters sold -1.713 0.063
subscription price 1.524 0.052
circulation -2.430 0.090
advertising proﬁts -1.713 0.063
readership proﬁts 0.076 0.180
total proﬁts -0.604 0.135
This table shows the effects of the merger between the NRC Handelsblad, nrc.next
and the Telegraaf group. Numbers are percentage changes.
decline by 1.7 percent, while subscription proﬁts would only marginally increase.27 The merging parties
would even lose in terms of proﬁts, while outsiders would marginally gain.28
Contrary to the results of the HHI-based analysis but consistently with the results of UPP and SSNIP,
the merger would seem to raise only modest concerns on the readers market and a big concern on the
advertising market. The latter is due to the fact that as subscription prices are raised after the merger,
readership declines and advertisers pay a much higher price per reader, although the price per column
millimeter is unchanged. Clearly, it is the two-sided nature of the market that plays a role here.
Finally, Table 6 shows the effects of the merger on advertisers and readers welfare. For the former, we
actually report the sum of the welfare changes, over all newspapers, relative to the situation in which all
ﬁrms are independently owned. This is given by the negative of the sum of the integral over the demand
functions (1), where the integral is taken from the advertising price per reader under the respective
ownership situations to the the advertising price per reader when newspapers are independently owned.29
For the readers, we report average welfare per person over 13 years of age per year, as implied by the
estimated price coefﬁcient and the well-known log-sum welfare formula for the logit model.
The table shows that readers welfare is almost unaffected by the hypothetical merger. Overall, results
from full merger simulation suggest that, contrary to what is predicted by an HHI analysis but consis-
tently with a UPP analysis and a SSNIP-type test, the merger raises concerns of unilateral effects more
on the advertisers side of the market and less on the readers side of the market.
may affect the welfare effects of a merger among two-sided platforms.
27Note that the decline in advertising demand and therefore in advertising proﬁts would not take place in the absence of an
indirect network effect from readers to advertisers.
28This ﬁnding is reminiscent of the results of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) for a Cournot oligopoly with homoge-
neous products. Here, however, ﬁrms set prices.
29We do not report absolute levels of welfare here, because the area under the demand function is not ﬁnite.
24Table 6: Welfare
advertisers readers
all newspapers independently owned 0.00 37.70
ownership as of the end of 2009 -102.88 36.77
as before, only NRC and NRN independently owned -81.85 37.10
as before, but NRC and NRN joined Telegraaf group -115.48 36.81
all newspapers owned by same ﬁrm -519.98 33.87
This table shows advertiser and reader welfare for different ownership combinations. The for-
mer is relative to the situation in which all newspapers are independently owned. Both are
measured in Euros per year and reader NRC stands for NRC Handelsblad, and NRN stands for
nrc.next.
7 Summary and conclusions
We investigate different ways to assess unilateral merger effects in a two-sided market by applying them
to an hypothetical merger in the Dutch newspaper industry.
Lacking other sources of information on diversion ratios and proﬁt margins, we ﬁrst specify and estimate
a structural model of demand for differentiated products on both the readership and the advertising side
of the market. In particular, we estimate a log-linear demand for advertising slots and a logit demand for
newspaper copies. This allows us to recover price elasticities and indirect network effects.
Surprisingly, our estimates indicate that not only a higher readership is associated with a higher demand
for advertising, but also a higher level of advertising leads to a small rise in readership. So that readers
would seem on average to like advertising. The ﬁnding is not in line with Argentesi and Filistrucchi
(2007) for the Italian daily newspapers market, and also not with Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen
(2009) for the Belgian newspaper market and Fan (2010) for the US daily newspapers market. We
therefore proceed under the assumption that advertising has a positive, albeit small, effect on circulation
and
follow Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2010) for recovering marginal costs from an oligopoly model
of the supply side.
We use these estimates of price elasticities, network effects and marginal costs to compare different
methods used to evaluate merger effects: HHI, SSNIP, UPP and a full merger simulation. This means
that our results are based on the assumption that the estimated parameters are the true ones, which is
subject to demand being correctly speciﬁed. However, making these assumptions enables us to perform
what we believe is a fair comparison of methods in a realistic context, as it allows us to abstract from
25differences in the quality of the data used in the different approaches.
Our results indicate that in our case the projected effects of the merger on prices are generally lower once
the two-sidedness of the market is taken into account. This is consistent with the newspaper market being
characterized by a positive indirect network effect of readership on advertising demand higher than the
positive indirect network effect of advertising demand on readership. In other words, the results show
that “advertisers care more about readers than readers care for advertising”. Since raising the newspaper
price is likely to lead not only to a loss in readers but also to a loss in advertising, the post-merger
tendency to increase prices will be lower than in the absence of network effects.
Overall, in our case, the effects of the hypothetical merger on subscription prices and readers welfare are
found to be small. Importantly, with the exception of market concentration analysis, there does not seem
to be a signiﬁcant difference between the different methods used to assess the unilateral effects of the
hypothetical merger we analyzed. In fact, since we used SSNIP and UPP formulae adjusted for two-sided
platforms, the HHI-based analysis was the only one that did not take into account the two-sided nature
of the market.
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27Appendix: Additional tables and ﬁgures
Table 7: Subscription prices and circulation
price per quarter circulation in thousands
indep init pre post mon indep init pre post mon
AD1 246.84 251.48 249.36 249.51 260.54 458.12 445.20 451.15 451.61 423.48
BAK 179.49 179.91 179.78 179.93 201.54 11.30 11.33 11.33 11.34 10.08
BND 245.78 247.19 247.09 247.18 255.06 115.25 114.54 114.46 114.53 109.65
BRA 254.93 255.58 255.48 255.58 263.22 132.17 132.00 131.91 132.00 126.47
EIN 250.91 251.30 251.20 251.29 258.30 110.79 110.82 110.75 110.82 106.60
GEL 251.89 252.72 252.61 252.72 262.43 153.35 153.08 152.96 153.07 144.83
GOO 237.94 246.12 245.81 250.14 259.65 29.56 28.14 28.08 27.33 26.19
HAR 234.67 242.55 242.28 246.03 254.26 43.29 41.28 41.21 40.27 38.86
LEI 229.69 235.41 235.18 238.26 246.68 34.35 33.19 33.13 32.49 31.17
LEW 233.80 234.34 234.25 234.36 244.90 94.56 94.58 94.52 94.59 89.08
LIM 270.92 271.11 271.03 271.10 276.53 128.19 128.32 128.26 128.32 124.58
NED 280.84 281.28 281.12 281.26 303.63 30.53 30.63 30.59 30.62 26.40
NOO 236.90 237.38 237.25 237.36 247.66 142.95 143.07 142.96 143.06 134.95
NOR 239.63 246.12 245.98 247.45 253.35 146.52 141.04 140.93 139.82 136.47
NRC 309.39 316.98 310.40 316.28 330.72 218.09 207.20 217.61 208.25 190.38
NRN 188.66 197.22 190.57 195.79 209.88 88.67 83.69 87.84 84.57 77.62
PAR 241.87 249.87 246.12 246.38 260.49 92.09 87.51 89.68 89.84 82.60
PZC 245.13 247.19 247.07 247.18 258.98 55.67 55.15 55.11 55.15 51.80
REF 258.15 258.61 258.45 258.57 280.02 54.94 55.14 55.07 55.12 47.84
STE 251.58 252.55 252.42 252.55 264.96 134.59 134.30 134.19 134.30 125.22
TEL 236.02 238.98 238.79 240.75 255.46 663.27 653.09 652.15 643.52 585.13
TRO 286.60 294.31 292.14 292.32 308.92 111.17 105.52 107.00 107.13 96.48
TWE 242.39 243.44 243.36 243.46 252.03 115.12 114.69 114.63 114.70 109.71
VOL 266.37 273.07 270.63 270.83 287.59 269.98 258.24 262.44 262.82 235.77
This table shows prices and quantities for different situations. Within each of the two panels, the columns are for independent
ownership of all newspapers (indep), the initial ownership situation (init), the situation after the NRC Handelsblad and
nrc.next have become independently owned (pre), the situation in which they are bought by the Telegraaf group (post), and
ﬁnally the situation in which all newspapers are owned by the same company (mon).
28Table 8: Advertising prices and sold quantities
price per column millimeter million column millimeters sold
indep init pre post mon indep init pre post mon
AD1 17.43 17.43 17.43 17.43 17.43 5.91 5.79 5.84 5.85 5.59
BAK 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 5.19 5.20 5.19 5.20 4.78
BND 11.56 11.56 11.56 11.56 11.56 9.20 9.16 9.16 9.16 8.88
BRA 12.71 12.71 12.71 12.71 12.71 8.34 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.08
EIN 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 9.62 9.63 9.62 9.63 9.37
GEL 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 8.13 8.12 8.12 8.12 7.81
GOO 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 7.58 7.32 7.31 7.17 6.96
HAR 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 10.05 9.73 9.71 9.56 9.32
LEI 1.82 1.82 1.82 1.82 1.82 7.70 7.51 7.50 7.40 7.19
LEW 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 12.98 12.98 12.97 12.98 12.45
LIM 5.82 5.82 5.82 5.82 5.82 4.56 4.56 4.56 4.56 4.47
NED 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 2.03 2.03 2.03 2.03 1.83
NOO 3.16 3.16 3.16 3.16 3.16 11.77 11.77 11.77 11.77 11.30
NOR 2.72 2.72 2.72 2.72 2.72 9.29 9.04 9.04 8.99 8.84
NRC 7.32 7.32 7.32 7.32 7.32 6.16 5.94 6.15 5.96 5.60
NRN 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.86 2.10 2.02 2.09 2.03 1.91
PAR 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90 5.97 5.76 5.86 5.87 5.53
PZC 1.79 1.79 1.79 1.79 1.79 7.99 7.94 7.93 7.94 7.60
REF 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 4.79 4.80 4.80 4.80 4.35
STE 4.89 4.89 4.89 4.89 4.89 7.75 7.74 7.73 7.74 7.37
TEL 13.11 13.11 13.11 13.11 13.11 12.27 12.14 12.12 12.01 11.24
TRO 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.33 3.21 3.24 3.24 3.01
TWE 3.18 3.18 3.18 3.18 3.18 8.24 8.21 8.21 8.21 7.96
VOL 7.68 7.68 7.68 7.68 7.68 5.77 5.59 5.65 5.66 5.24
This table shows prices and quantities for different situations. Within each of the two panels, the columns
are for independent ownership of all newspapers (indep), the initial ownership situation (init), the situation
after the NRC Handelsblad and nrc.next have become independently owned (pre), the situation in which they
are bought by the Telegraaf group (post), and ﬁnally the situation in which all newspapers are owned by the
same company (mon).
29Table 9: Advertising and readership proﬁts
advertising proﬁt readership proﬁts
indep init pre post mon indep init pre post mon
AD1 43.71 42.84 43.24 43.27 41.36 64.07 64.33 64.24 64.37 65.03
BAK 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.79 1.70 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.74
BND 45.15 44.95 44.93 44.95 43.60 16.93 16.99 16.96 16.98 17.13
BRA 44.99 44.95 44.93 44.95 43.62 19.22 19.28 19.25 19.28 19.44
EIN 44.94 44.95 44.93 44.95 43.74 16.29 16.33 16.31 16.33 16.46
GEL 18.99 18.97 18.96 18.97 18.25 21.85 21.94 21.90 21.94 22.16
GOO 2.17 2.10 2.10 2.06 2.00 4.25 4.27 4.26 4.26 4.33
HAR 6.00 5.80 5.80 5.70 5.56 6.25 6.28 6.26 6.27 6.37
LEI 5.94 5.80 5.80 5.72 5.55 4.79 4.81 4.80 4.81 4.87
LEW 10.58 10.58 10.57 10.58 10.14 13.42 13.48 13.46 13.48 13.63
LIM 11.26 11.27 11.26 11.27 11.04 19.42 19.46 19.44 19.46 19.57
NED 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.55 3.90 3.93 3.92 3.93 3.98
NOO 15.81 15.82 15.81 15.82 15.18 20.30 20.39 20.35 20.39 20.62
NOR 10.70 10.42 10.42 10.36 10.18 22.36 22.44 22.40 22.43 22.70
NRC 19.13 18.46 19.11 18.52 17.39 28.91 29.04 29.07 29.05 29.30
NRN 3.44 3.30 3.42 3.33 3.13 12.08 12.12 12.14 12.13 12.22
PAR 7.34 7.08 7.20 7.21 6.80 12.78 12.84 12.83 12.87 13.00
PZC 6.07 6.03 6.02 6.03 5.77 8.54 8.57 8.56 8.57 8.66
REF 1.87 1.88 1.87 1.87 1.70 6.99 7.04 7.02 7.03 7.13
STE 16.09 16.07 16.06 16.07 15.30 19.38 19.47 19.44 19.47 19.71
TEL 68.28 67.55 67.48 66.85 62.53 83.74 84.39 84.15 84.29 85.25
TRO 4.85 4.67 4.72 4.72 4.39 14.91 14.96 14.94 14.98 15.09
TWE 11.10 11.07 11.07 11.07 10.73 17.96 18.01 18.00 18.02 18.17
VOL 18.82 18.24 18.45 18.46 17.11 35.69 35.87 35.81 35.91 36.17
This table shows advertising and readership proﬁts in million Euros of 2002 and for different situations.
Within each of the two panels, the columns are for independent ownership of all newspapers (indep), the
initial ownership situation (init), the situation after the NRC Handelsblad and nrc.next have become inde-
pendently owned (pre), the situation in which they are bought by the Telegraaf group (post), and ﬁnally the
situation in which all newspapers are owned by the same company (mon).
30